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The Small Plan Audit Program:
The Opinions of the Court
Arnold F. Shapiro*

Abstract
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspective of many pension actuaries is the IRS's small plan audit program. The program initially was
expected to raise two-thirds of a billion dollars by targeting well-funded defined benefit plans with five or fewer participants. The focus of the audit was the assumed
interest rate and the normal retirement age, both of which the IRS generally regarded
as too low.
While the focus of the audit was relatively narrow, the issue it raised was a
funda mental one. The basic question was the extent to which the IRS could impose its
fundamental
unilateral interpretation of actuarial principles on pension actuaries.
Not surprising, many small plan audit cases ended in the tax courts. In due course
decisions and opinions have been rendered in three lead cases. This article presents the
opinions of these cases as they relate to actuarial practice and discusses some of their
implications.
Key words and phrases: defined benefit plans, actuarial assumptions, unit credit method,
IRS

1 Introduction
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspective of many pension actuaries is the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS)
small plan audit program. 1 The program began in November 1989,
when the IRS2 initiated a nationwide plan to audit the actuarial
assumptions of approximately 18,000 small well-funded defined bene* Arnold Shapiro, Ph.D., F.5.A.,
F.s.A., is Professor of Actuarial Science and Insurance, Robert
G. Schwartz Faculty Fellow, and director of the Risk Management Research Center at
Penn State University. He serves as editor of Actuarial Research Clearing House and
associate editor of Insurance: Mathematics and Economics.
1 Even though this paper deals only with court cases in the United States, the opinion
of the court may have implications in any country where actuarial assumptions are at
issue.
2 Throughout this paper, the abbreviation IRC means the Internal Revenue Code and
the abbreviation IRS refers to the Internal Revenue Service of the U.s.
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fit pension plans. The program initially was expected to raise twothirds of a billion dollars in additional tax revenue.
The specific plans to be audited shared several characteristics:

• The plan year ended in 1986, 1987, or 1988;3
• The plan covered one to five participants;

•

••
•

The plan annual contribution generally, but not always, was
$100,000 or more;
The plan was valued with an interest assumption of less than 8
percent (IRS memo, November 29, 1989); and
The normal retirement age of the plan was less than age 65.

It was estimated that deductions would be disallowed retroactively

in 85 percent of the plans to be examined.
The program fell considerably short of its expectations. Although
all the audits under the program were concluded by July 31, 1992,
only $38 million in revenue had been produced by December 1992, and
the program appeared to be floundering; see the BNA Pension
Reporter (1992). In retrospect this is not surprising because the effort
immediately met intense and unrelenting resistance from small plan
actuaries, their associations, and their advocates.
It was not long after the small plan audit program was instituted
before several of the ensuing cases reached the tax court. These cases
were assigned to Judge Charles E. Clapp II, who, after observing that
there were likely to be many more such cases, selected some representative ones for trial. His stated intent was to develop judicial precedence and guidance so that subsequent cases could be resolved without
costly litigation.
The suits comprise two institutional and eight noninstitutional
cases. The two institutional cases, the first to be tried, involved large
successful law firm partnerships that had adopted individmll
defined benefit (IDB) plans for their partners. 4 The firms were the
Texas-based firm of Vinson & Elkins and the New York firm of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Wachtell Lipton). In both
instances, assumptions used for valuing their plans were deemed
3 These plan years were chosen because the statute of limitations was ended for plan
years pnor to 1986 (IRe §6S01) and the tax law changed for plan years that ended
after 1988. The primary relevant changes in the tax law were the revision of the fullfunding limitation to include current liability (IRe §412(b)(S),(c)(7) and (1)(7» and the
amendment to IRe §412(c)(3), which requires that each actuarial assumption (rather
than actuarial assumptions in the aggregate) be reasonable.
4 In view of IRe §401(a)(26), individual defined benefit plans of this type no longer
are allowed, and these plans have been terminated.
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unreasonable by the IRS, which sought to disallow their deductions.
These cases were tried in January 1992, and a decision was handed
down the following July.
The remainder of the cases involved a variety of small businesses, each of which had a small defined benefit pension plan for
one or two key employees. Because the cases arose under an audit
program in Phoenix, they came to be known as the Phoenix cases, but
subsequently were referred to as Citrus Valley because they were consolidated and tried as Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et a1. 5 These cases
involved frontloading of the contribution under the unit credit funding
method in addition to actuarial assumption challenges. The cases
were tried in February 1992, and a decision was handed down the following September.
This article presents the opinions of the court as they relate to
the actuarial practice associated with small defined benefit plans
and discusses some of their implications. First, the actuarial issues
contested by the IRS are summarized. Then the opinions of the court
relating to these issues are discussed. The paper ends with a comment
on the implications of the court's opinions.

2 The Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS
The general actuarial issue raised by the IRS was whether actuarial assumptions used by the enrolled actuary to determine the
plans' costs were reasonable in the aggregate and represented the
actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plans as
required by IRe §412(c)(3). The specific issues contested by the IRS
are summarized in Table 1. 6 For example, for the Vinson & Elkins
plans the IRS contested the 5 percent preretirement and postretirement interest rate assumption, the normal retirement age of 62,
the 5 percent postretirement expense load, and the preretirement mortality assumption. Moreover, the IRS contended that these assumptions were not offset by any other assumptions that would make the
assumptions reasonable in the aggregate.

5 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. , Robert J. and Janice A. Davis, Old Frontier Investment,
Inc., Lear Eye Clinic, Ltd., Robert Stephan, Jr., Ltd., Boren Steel Consultants, Inc.,
Arizona Orthopedic Institute of Traumatic and Reconstructive Surgery, Jonathan R. and
Renee K. Fox, and Brody Enterprises, Inc. Although separately docketed, Arizona
~rthopedic is a successor to Jonathan Fox.
This paper does not deal with the nonactuarial issues of these cases, which included
timing of amendments, automatic approval of a cost method change, and validation of
hours worked.
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Most of the issues of Table 1 are self-evident,7 but those related
to the mortality tables and the cost methods need clarification. For
the institutional cases, the lOB plans that contained life insurance
used the 1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary (CSO) mortality
table for the preretirement mortality assumption and the 1971
Individual Annuity Mortality (lAM) table for the postretirement
mortality assumption. While the IRS agreed that such plans may
provide a preretirement death benefit and may fund these benefits
using envelope funding,S it contested the use of the 1958 CSO table on
the grounds that it grossly overstated the expected actual mortality
experience.
TABLE 1

Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS
Interest Rate
Expenses
Pre
Post

Mortality
Table
Pre Post

Cost
Method

Pre

Post

NRA

Vinson & Elkins

5%

5%

62

Wachtell Lipton

5%

5%

55

Citrus Valley

5%

5%

Davis

5%

5%

Old Frontier

5%

5%

Lear Eye Clinic

5%

5%

55

..J

Robert Stephan

5%

5%

55

..J

Boren Steel

5%

5%

Arizona Orthopedic

5%

5%

55

..J

..J

Fox

5%

5%

55

..J

..J

Brody Enterprises

5%

5%

55

..J

..J

7.5%

5%

..J

5/7.5%

..J

Citrus Valley et a/.

55

6/4.5%

7 Some of these plans could be differentiated only on the basis of their credible experience. It had been anticipated that the court's decision would be affected materially by
plan experience, but this turned out not to be the case.
S The envelope method may be used with any cost method and with any type of
insurance policy. It is the method that generally is used with the unit credIt funding
method or with insurance policies that do not have guaranteed projected cash values
at retirement. Under the envelope method, assets are adjusted by adding the cash
value of the insurance as of the valuation date. The normal cost and accrued liability
are calculated using the adjusted assets.
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The situation in Citrus Valley was somewhat different. In one
instance, an insurance company's guaranteed female annuity table was
used for a plan with a single male participant; in another, a female
mortality table with a seven year age setback was used for a plan
with a single male participant; and in another, an age setback was
used for a participant with a substandard family medical history.
The IRS contested the mortality assumption in each instance.
The IRS contested the actuarial cost method in a significant number of the Citrus Valley cases. The issue was straightforward. These
plans provided for the accrual of all, or a significant portion, of the
benefits provided under the plan in a very few years, a procedure
commonly referred to as frontloading. Using the unit credit funding
method, the benefits then were funded as they accrued with the contribution currently deductible. The IRS contended that while frontloading of benefit accruals is permissible from a qualification standpoint, an equivalent frontloading of the deductible contribution is not
permitted and that no more than 10 percent of the maximum benefit
may be allocated to a given year's normal cost, just as the maximum
benefit that can be provided to a participant with one year of service
is 10 percent of the overall IRC §415 limit.

3 The Experts
Before proceeding to the findings of the court, it is worth noting
the credentials of the experts chosen by each side and the focus of
their testimony or report.

3.1 The Institutional Cases
The experts for institutional cases included James F. Rabenhorst,
managing partner at Price Waterhouse, who testified regarding the
retirement age assumption; Richard R. Joss, Ph.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A,
E.A., resource actuary for the Wyatt Company, who testified regarding the actuarial assumptions; Mary S. Riebold, F.S.A., M.A.A.A.,
E.A., F.C.A., managing director for Mercer and then-president of the
Conference of Consulting Actuaries, who testified regarding the actuarial assumptions; Steven H. Schechter, director of management
information systems at Wolper Ross, who testified regarding interest
rate assumptions based on an analysis of Form 5500 data; and John W.
Peavy III, Ph.D., C.F.A., professor of finance at Southern Methodist
University, who served to rebut the contentions of Shapiro and
Haneberg regarding the interest rate assumption.
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The experts for the IRS in these cases included Ronald L.
Haneberg, J.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A., F.CA., previously a consulting
actuary with Buck Consultants, who testified regarding the actuarial
assumptions; Claude Poulin, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., president of
Poulin Associates, Inc., who testified regarding the actuarial assumptions; Alan C Shapiro, Ph.D., professor of banking and finance at the
University of Southern California, who testified regarding the interest rate; William S. Borden, Ph.D., senior program analyst at
Mathematica Policy Research, who testified regarding the investment return and in rebuttal to Joss; and Jeffrey F. Jaffe, M.B.A., Ph.D.,
associate professor of finance at the Wharton School, who provided
an expert report on the validity of the interest rate assumption.

3.2 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et al.
The experts for Citrus Valley included Kenneth D. Klingler,
F.s.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., a consulting actuary with the Wyatt
Company, who testified regarding the assumptions; and Arthur W.
Anderson, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., who previously had been a consultant for William M. Mercer, Johnson & Higgins, and the Wyatt
Company and was the author of Pension Mathematics for Actuaries,
testified as an expert with respect to the unit credit funding method.
The experts for the IRS included J. Ruben Rigel, J.D., F.S.A.,
F.CA., M.A.A.A., E.A., who testified with respect to the assumptions and the unit credit funding method; Roger Ibbotson, M.B.A.,
Ph.D., president and chief executive officer of Ibbotson & Associates,
Inc., who testified with respect to the interest rate assumption;
William S. Borden, PhD.,
Ph.D., who testified with respect to the interest
rate and retirement age assumption; and James E. Holland, A.S.A.,
E.A., chief of the Pension Actuarial Branch of the Service, who provided an expert report dealing with the unit credit funding method.

4 The Findings of the Tax Court
The court generally found against the IRS on most of the issues. In
the institutional cases, for example, the court held that "[t]he actuarial assumptions made by the plans' enrolled actuary were reasonable in the aggregate and represented the actuary's best estimate of
anticipated experience under the plans, as required by §412(c)(3);
accordingly, as the assumptions used were not substantially unreasonable, [the IRS] is precluded from requiring a retroactive change of
assumptions.
assumptions.""
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The court held similarly for the noninstitutional cases that all of
the challenged actuarial assumptions for each of the plans at issue
were reasonable. Further, the certifying actuaries for the plans using
the unit credit funding method funded within allowable limits and
made reasonable allocations of costs, except for one plan that was
complicated because of an amendment issue (Citrus Valley, p. 101).
Accordingly, the actuarial assumptions and methods used for the
plans were reasonable in the aggregate. A fortiori, these assumptions
were not substantially unreasonable in order to permit retroactive
changes of assumptions for years prior to the year in which the audit
was made.
The outcomes of the cases were not obvious prior to the decisions.
It is interesting and informative to read how an unbiased legal
authority interprets the actuarial issues involved. The following is a
recapitulation of how the court reached its conclusions.

4.1 Deference to the Enrolled Actuary
A major conclusion was that deference must be given to the
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary who certifies the funding
of the plan. In this regard, Judge Clapp gave his interpretation of
Congressional intent the full weight of legal authority.
Judge Clapp emphasized that Congress was aware in enacting
ERISA that actuaries would playa major role in ensuring that retirement plans would be sufficiently able to provide retirement income
when due. He observed that Congress recognized the importance of
the actuarial assumptions and the cost methods chosen by actuaries
in determining plan funding amounts and that Congress explicitly
noted that such determinations by actuaries would involve making
predictions and would be a matter of judgment involving many factors
and producing a range of results. He also commented that Congress
decided that accepting a range of reasonableness for funding amounts
for retirement plans would be more desirable and more effective than
imposing an inflexible legislative standard on actuaries and, therefore, rejected imposing mandatory funding assumptions and methods
(Wachtell Lipton, pp. 10-11).

4.2 The Interest Rate Assumption
In reaching his decision on the interest rate assumption, Judge
Clapp identified what he regarded as particularly important factors. He noted that the combination of these factors weighed heavily
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in favor of concluding that 5 percent was reasonable. For the institutional plans these factors were (Vinson & Elkins, p. 46):

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

The nature of the responsibility Congress entrusted to enrolled
actuaries in the statutory scheme enacted for defined benefit pension plans;
The conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection process;
The fact that IDB plans were long-term plans, with funding to
occur over a 30 year to 50 year period;
The fact that IDB plans were self-directed, with each participant being a co-acfministrator,9 especially because most of the
IDB plans did not employ a professional manager;
The fact that IDB plans lacked credible experience with respect
to earnings, investment strategies, and otherwise;
The risk of losing compounded earnings in a tax-exempt trust associated with using overly optimistic assumptions and the resulting
requirement for unanticipated higher contributions in later years;
The relative closeness of all the actuarial experts' reasonable
ranges;lO and
The fact that most actuaries used interest rate assumptions of
between 5 percent and 6 percent for small plans during the years
at issue. l l

He listed the same factors, except for the relative closeness of the
reasonable ranges, for the noninstitutional plans (Citrus Valley, p. 69).
Judge Clapp also clarified the role of a prudent actuary in the
selection of the interest assumption. He noted that the actuary's primary duty to plan participants under ERISA is to establish a realistic contribution pattern over the long term so that the plan sponsor
will provide adequate funding for the ultimate pension obligation.
Thus, prudent actuaries maintain a long-term conservative view that
9 It is relevant that each partner/participant served as a coadministrator because that
meant that the plan assets of the IDB prans were not commingled for the purpose of
investment and, therefore, could not realize the rates of return earned by larger plans.
10 Not all the experts agreed that their reasonable ranges were close. See, for
example, Ronald 1. Haneberg, "Not All Experts Agree," Enrolled Actuaries Report
(November, 1992), p. 3.

11 This conclusion follows from Schechter's testimony that actuaries established
interest rate assumptions between 5 percent and 6 percent for 1986 plans with fewer
than 100 participants for 76.6 percent of the preretirement assumptions and 82.5 percent
of the postretirement assumptions. Schechter's conclusions were based on his analysis
of data obtained from the Department of Labor.
The court was not swayed by the IRS's contention that rates in general use during
the time were irrelevant.
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will ensure benefit security for plan participants in selecting actuarial assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 27)
Rejecting the IRS's contention that 8 percent would have been a
reasonable interest rate assumption because that amount could have
been earned during the years at issue, the court commented that
"Congress did not entrust the nation's tax-advantaged retirement savings system to hypothetical returns that the markets 'should' bear"
(Vinson & Elkins, p. 49).
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the court attached only
minor importance to the testimony and reports of nonactuaries, in
spite of the fact that they were experts in the field of investment.
This was true, for example, even with the testimony of the wellknown Roger Ibbotson. 12 The rationale was that these persons were
not actuaries and that conclusions they drew would have limited
application in the determination of the reasonableness of actuarial
assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 47). The court reasoned that if a
financial analyst's predicted rate is higher than the actual rate
earned, the investor simply earns less than expected, whereas if an
actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant risk that the
plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full benefits will
be unpaid (Citrus Valley, p. 71).

4.3 Retirement Age Assumption
The court seemed willing to accept a normal retirement age
(NRA) assumption that was less than age 65 as long as it was based
on reasons that were "sincere, credible, and reasonable." It explicitly
rejected the IRS's argument that statements by the participant in a
one person plan were merely self-serving, even when there was no
evidence that the underlying reasons had been explained to the plan
actuary. (See, for example, Citrus Valley, p. 83.)
The IRS took the position that failure of a key participant to
retire at the assumed normal retirement age was clear evidence that
the assumption was unreasonable. In rejecting this position, the court
noted that" ... the certifying actuary is not charged with the responsibility of determining when a plan participant will actually begin
to receive the plan benefits. That would be an impossible task.
Further, the fact that a plan participant might choose to, or actually
does, delay receipt of the plan benefits beyond the assumed retire12 Ibbotson & Associates, Inc. sells financial software and data and provides consulting
services to investment management firms. Roger Ibbotson is an often-quoted authority on
stocks, bonds, Treasury bills, and inflation.
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ment age does not make the retirement age assumption unreasonable.
An actuary is charged with looking into the future and making a
determination as to, among other things, when benefits under the
plan could begin" (Vinson & Elkins, p. 58).
Some of the Citrus Valley plans contained a segregated account
provision, which meant that at the normal retirement age benefits
were segregated into a separate account even if the participant chose
to continue working beyond that age. The present value of accrued
benefits at the normal retirement age is treated in effect as an
account balance in a defined contribution plan. The experts of both
parties agreed that the inclusion of a segregated account provision in
a plan rendered the date of a participant's actual retirement irrelevant (Citrus Valley, p. 75).
Given that the experts agreed, the court concluded that the segregation provision justified the finding that it was reasonable for the
assumed retirement age to be the normal retirement age stated in the
plan, because that would be the age at which the participant would
elect to segregate the accrued benefits. This obviated the retirement
issue for a number of plans that had a normal retirement age of 55.

4.4 Expense Loadings
The court held for the taxpayer in each instance where the IRS
challenged the expense loading. While Judge Clapp had some misgivings about the 7.5 percent expense loading in the institutional
cases, he found it not to be substantially unreasonable and acceptable
on the basis of reasonable in the aggregate.
He rejected the IRS's argument in the noninstitutional cases that
expense loading is merely a device to increase deductions. His opinion
observed that "[the IRS] offered a rather perfunctory rebuttal, stating simply that [the] addition of postretirement expense load
assumptions would further increase the funding goal and the amount
of the deduction ... This is not, however, unreasonable per se, as [the
IRS] seems to believe ... A postretirement expense load is a reasonable manner in which to fund the postretirement administrative
fees" (Citrus Valley, p. 91).

4.5 Mortality Assumptions
The court found that it was reasonable in the institutional cases
to use the 1958 CSO mortality table to compute the cost of the preretirement death benefit. It explicitly rejected the IRS's arguments
that a preretirement mortality assumption was unreasonable in a one
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person plan and that even if it were appropriate to use a preretirement mortality assumption, it was unreasonable to assume the 1958
CSO mortality table for the preretirement mortality and the 1971
lAM table for the postretirement mortality for the same person
because the tables are incompatible. As the court pointed out, the
probability of the participant's preretirement death was not at issue.
The issue was to estimate the life insurance premium expense, and
this could be done best by using the same type of mortality table as
would be used by the insurance company (Vinson & Elkins, p. 67).
In the noninstitutional cases, while the court was "not entirely
convinced that the mortality assumption ... is completely reasonable,
it is not substantially unreasonable so as to justify a retroactive
adjustment" (Citrus Valley, p. 87). Thus, even in situations as extreme
as the case involving a male participant that used the 1983 lAM
table for females with a seven year age setback, the mortality
assumption implicitly was approved by the court in its approval of
the funding assumptions in the aggregate.

4.6 The Unit Credit Funding Method
One of the surprises to emerge from the Citrus Valley cases was
the court finding against the IRS on the frontloading issue under the
unit credit funding method. The IRS previously had won the wellpublicized Mirza case (Jerome Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United
States, 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989)), where the same issue was in
question and the same argument was used. In Mirza, the court agreed
with the IRS's interpretation that IRC §404(a)(1)(A)(iii) provides
that the maximum that can be deducted in any year is the "normal
cost" plus an amount necessary to amortize "past service" and other
supplementary cost over ten years, as determined under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary. It reasoned that "[i]t is simply inconceivable that Congress would take pains to provide for the amortization of past service credits but intended to allow taxpayers to circumvent this requirement by the device of structuring their plans to
accrue benefits in a single year" (Mirza, p. 232)
Judge Clapp enumerated three reasons for rejecting the Mirza conclusion (Citrus Valley, pp. 104-105). First, "[t]he language of
§404(a)(1)(A)(iii) setting forth the limit on deductible contributions
used the conditional phrase 'if *** provided by the plan' when setting forth the treatment for past service cost." Thus, there would be
only a past service liability if it were provided by the plan. Second,
"[d]espite [the IRS's] assertions to the contrary, there is no
express[ed] or implied connection between the limitations of §415 and
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any allocation under §1.412(c)(3)-1(e)(3)" (Citrus Valley, p. 99). That
is, there is no requirement that the allocation between normal cost
and past service liability be consistent with the limitations on benefit accruals. Third, "the Unit Credit Funding Method-in connection
with a career-average pay plan-inherently allocates benefits in a
reasonable manner to the past and future years of service for which
benefits accrued and will accrue."
This finding is only relevant for plan years beginning prior to
1987, as the approach discussed is not possible for plan years beginning after December 31, 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended
§415(b)(5)
§415(b )(5) so that the dollar limitation is phased in over the first
ten years of participation in a plan rather than ten years of service
with the plan sponsor.

4.7 Evidentiary Matters
The IRS consistently has objected to actuaries' use of its training
manuals, audit guidelines, internal and external correspondence, and
transcripts of speeches made by Service employees regarding the matters at issue in these cases. The court concluded (Vinson & Elkins, pp.
75-77), however, that actuaries can take into account IRS documents
that have been disseminated publicly because "they are part of the
actuarial universe within which all actuaries must live, think, and
work in arriving at their conclusions as to reasonableness and their
best estimates regarding appropriate contributions." Moreover, actuaries can be guided by the speeches of high-ranking Service employees.
One specific comment that had been referenced by many pension
actuaries is the highly publicized transcript of the Ira Cohen speech
at the 1986 Enrolled Actuaries meeting, wherein he stated that a 4
percentage point corridor on either side of the prevailing long-term
Treasury bond rate was within the reasonable range of interest rate
assumptions. In spite of the fact that Cohen was the director of the
Actuarial and Technical Division of the Service at the time of the
speech, the IRS claimed that he had not spoken for the Service and,
moreover, the speech was merely hearsay. The court disagreed with
the IRS's position, and asserted that such a speech, heard by many
actuaries and disseminated by publication to many more, is not
hearsay, as long as the transcript is "true and correct."
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5 Implications
There seems to be a consensus among small plan attorneys that
the opinions rendered in these cases are likely to be afforded considerable credibility.13 Not only are they "lengthy, studious, and thoroughly analyzed," but they are based to a large extent on "factual
conclusions," which makes them difficult to overturn; see Reish and
Ashton (1992). Moreover, 14 of 15 participating tax court judges in the
Phoenix cases concurred with the opinions.
It is difficult to anticipate how the courts will react in future
cases where the issues are similar, but the facts and circumstances are
materially different. The following basic principles, however, seem
to have emerged:

•
•
•

The intent of Congress is that deference should be given to the
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary;
While assumptions are required to be reasonable and Con~ress did
not permit actuaries unfettered liberty,14 the pragmatIc test is
that assumptions are not "substantially unreasonable;"15 and
When formulating assumptions, it is appropriate for the actuary
to be guided by the "sincere, credible, and reasonable" expectations of the plan sponsor and IRS documents and insights that
have been publicly disseminated.

In the past actuaries have struggled to formulate a workable
interpretation of pension laws and regulations for small plans. In
most cases, actuaries are not attorneys, however-while their interpretation of these laws and regulations may have seemed reasonable
to them, there has been a need for an authoritative unbiased interpretation. These cases, with their scholarly exposition of the rules
and regulations, have done much to help put things into perspective.

References
BNA Pension Reporter (December 7, 1992): 2159.

13 See, for example, Katz, Harvey M., "A Death Knell for the Small-Plan Program,"
p. 1 and Reish, C. Frederick, and Bruce L. Ashton, "The Phoenix Tax Court Decisions:
What the Taxpayers Won," p. 3.
14 The court specifically noted that it was the intent of Congress that actuaries should

not sell their expertise to achieve tax-desired results rather than prudent plan
funding.

15 It is worth noting that the two main assumptions considered (the interest rate and

the retirement age) were argued successfully on an individual basis, rather than an
aggregate basis, so that the conclusions reached are still appropriate.

131

Small Plan Audit Program

Arnold F. Shapiro

Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, 99T.e. No. 21, No. 12900-89 etc.,
September 29,1992
Haneberg, Ronald L. "Not All Experts Agree." Enrolled Actuaries Report (November
1992): 3.
Internal memorandum to IRS field agents dated November 29, 1989.
Katz, Harvey M. "A Death Knell for the Small-Plan Program." Society of Actuaries'
Pension Section News (December 1992): 1.

Jerome Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United States, 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989).
Decisions.""
Reish, e. Frederick and Ashton, Bruce L. "Actuarial Audits: The Tax Court Decisions.
The Pension Actuanj
ActuanJ (August 1992): 5.
Reish, e. Frederick and Ashton, Bruce L. "The Phoenix Tax Court Decisions: What the
Taxpayers Won." The Pension Actllary (December 1992): 3.

Vinson & Elkins v. Commissioner, US TC, 99 T.e. No.2, Nos. 120030-90, 12412-91, July
14, 1992.
Wachtell, Lipton et al. v. Commissioner, US TC, T.e. Memo. 1992-392, No. 14574-90, July
14, 1992.

Arnold F. Shapiro
Penn State University
409 Business Administration Building
University Park, PA 16802

132

